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ABSTRACT
Since Artificial Intelligence (AI) software uses techniques like deep
lookahead search and stochastic optimization of huge neural net-
works to fit mammoth datasets, it often results in complex behavior
that is difficult for people to understand. Yet organizations are de-
ploying AI algorithms in many mission-critical settings. To trust
their behavior, we must make AI intelligible, either by using in-
herently interpretable models or by developing new methods for
explaining and controlling otherwise overwhelmingly complex de-
cisions using local approximation, vocabulary alignment, and inter-
active explanation. This paper argues that intelligibility is essential,
surveys recent work on building such systems, and highlights key
directions for research.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems have reached or exceeded hu-
man performance for many circumscribed tasks. As a result, they
are increasingly deployed in mission-critical roles, such as credit
scoring, predicting if a bail candidate will commit another crime,
selecting the news we read on social networks, and self-driving cars.
Unlike other mission-critical software, extraordinarily complex AI
systems are difficult to test: AI decisions are context specific and
often based on thousands or millions of factors. Typically, AI be-
haviors are generated by searching vast action spaces or learned by
the opaque optimization of mammoth neural networks operating
over prodigious amounts of training data. Almost by definition, no
clear-cut method can accomplish these AI tasks.
Unfortunately, much AI-produced behavior is alien, i.e., it can
fail in unexpected ways. This lesson is most clearly seen in the per-
formance of the latest deep neural network image analysis systems.
While their accuracy at object-recognition on naturally occurring
pictures is extraordinary, imperceptible changes to input images
can lead to erratic predictions, as shown in Figure 1. Why are these
recognition systems so brittle, making different predictions for ap-
parently identical images? Unintelligible behavior is not limited
to machine learning; many AI programs, such as automated plan-
ning algorithms, perform search-based lookahead and inference
whose complexity exceeds human abilities to verify. While some
search and planning algorithms are provably complete and optimal,
intelligibility is still important, because the underlying primitives
(e.g., search operators or action descriptions) are usually approx-
imations [29]. One can’t trust a proof that is based on (possibly)
incorrect premises.
Despite intelligibility’s apparent value, it remains remarkably
hard to specify what makes a system “intelligible.” We discuss
Figure 1: Adding an imperceptibly small vector to an im-
age changes the GoogLeNet [39] image recognizer’s classifi-
cation of the image from “panda” to “gibbon.” Figure taken
from Goodfellow et al. [9].
desiderata for intelligible behavior later in this article. In brief,
we seek AI systems where A) it is clear what factors caused the
system’s action [24], allowing the users to predict how changes
to the situation would have led to alternative behaviors, and B)
permits effective control of the AI by enabling interaction. As we
will see, there is a central tension between a concise explanation
and an accurate one.
As shown in Figure 2, our survey focuses on two high-level ap-
proaches to building intelligible AI software: 1) ensuring that the un-
derlying reasoning or learned model is inherently interpretable, e.g.,
by learning a linear model over a small number of well-understood
features, and 2) if it is necessary to use an inscrutablemodel, such as
complex neural networks or deep-lookahead search, then mapping
this complex system to a simpler, explanatory model for understand-
ing and control [28]. Using an interpretable model provides the
benefit of transparency and veracity; in theory, a user can see ex-
actly what the model is doing. Unfortunately, interpretable methods
may not perform as well as more complex ones, such as deep neural
networks. Conversely, the approach of mapping to an explanatory
model can apply to whichever AI technique is currently delivering
the best performance, but its explanation inherently differs from
the way the AI system actually operates. This yields a central co-
nundrum: how can a user trust that such an explanation reflects the
essence of the underlying decision and does not conceal important
details? We posit that the answer is to make the explanation system
interactive so users can drill down until they are satisfied with their
understanding.
The key challenge for designing intelligible AI is communicat-
ing a complex computational process to a human. This requires
interdisciplinary skills, including HCI as well as AI and machine
learning expertise. Furthermore, since the nature of explanation
has long been studied by philosophy and psychology, these fields
should also be consulted.
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Figure 2: Approaches for crafting intelligible AI. Section
numbers indicate where each aspect is discussed.
This survey highlights key approaches and challenges for build-
ing intelligible intelligence. Section 2 characterizes intelligibility
and explains why it is important even in systems with measurably
high performance. Section 4 describes the benefits and limitations
of GA2M, a powerful class of interpretable ML models. Then, in
Section 5, we characterize methods for handling inscrutable models,
discussing different strategies for mapping to a simpler, intelligible
model appropriate for explanation and control. Section 6 sketches
a vision for building interactive explanation systems, where the
mapping changes in response to the user’s needs. Section 7 argues
that intelligibility is important for search-based AI systems as well
as for those based on machine learning and that similar solutions
may be applied.
2 WHY INTELLIGIBILITY MATTERS
While it has been argued that explanations are much less important
than sheer performance in AI systems, there are many reasons why
intelligibility is important. We start by discussing technical reasons,
but social factors are important as well.
AI may have the Wrong Objective: In some situations, even
100% perfect performance may be insufficient, for example, if the
performance metric is flawed or incomplete due to the difficulty of
specifying it explicitly. Pundits have warned that an automated fac-
tory charged with maximizing paperclip production, could subgoal
on killing humans, who are using resources that could otherwise
be used in its task. While this example may be fanciful, it illustrates
that it is remarkably difficult to balance multiple attributes of a util-
ity function. For example, as Lipton observed [25], “An algorithm
for making hiring decisions should simultaneously optimize for
productivity, ethics and legality.” However, how does one express
this trade off? Other examples include balancing training error
while uncovering causality in medicine and balancing accuracy and
fairness in recidivism prediction [12]. For the latter, a simplified ob-
jective function such as accuracy combined with historically biased
training data may cause uneven performance for different groups
(e.g., people of color). Intelligibility empowers users to determine if
an AI is right for the right reasons.
AI may be Using Inadequate Features: Features are often
correlated, and when one feature is included in a model, machine
learning algorithms extract as much signal as possible from it, indi-
rectly modeling other features that weren’t included. This can lead
to problematic models, as illustrated by Figure 4b (and described
in the next Section), where the ML determined that a patient’s
prior history of asthma (a lung disease) was negatively correlated
with death by pneumonia, presumably due to correlation with (un-
modeled) variables, such as these patients receiving timely and
aggressive therapy for lung problems. An intelligible model helps
humans to spot these issues and correct them, e.g., by adding addi-
tional features [4].
Distributional Drift: A deployed model may perform poorly
in the wild, i.e., when a difference exists between the distribution
which was used during training and that encountered during de-
ployment. Furthermore, the deployment distribution may change
over time, perhaps due to feedback from the act of deployment.
This is common in adversarial domains, such as spam detection,
online ad pricing, and search engine optimization. Intelligibility
helps users determine when models are failing to generalize.
Facilitating User Control: Many AI systems induce user pref-
erences from their actions. For example, adaptive news feeds predict
which stories are likely most interesting to a user. As robots become
more common and enter the home, preference learning will become
ever more common. If users understand why the AI performed an
undesired action, they can better issue instructions that will lead
to improved future behavior.
User Acceptance: Even if they don’t seek to change system
behavior, users have been shown to be happier with and more
likely to accept algorithmic decisions if they are accompanied by
an explanation [18]. After being told that they should have their
kidney removed, it’s natural for a patient to ask the doctor why —
even if they don’t fully understand the answer.
Improving Human Insight: While improved AI allows au-
tomation of tasks previously performed by humans, this is not their
only use. In addition, scientists use machine learning to get insight
from big data. Medicine offers several examples [4]. Similarly, the
behavior of AlphaGo [35] has revolutionized human understanding
of the game. Intelligible models greatly facilitate these processes.
Legal Imperatives: The European Union’s GDPR legislation de-
crees citizens’ right to an explanation, and other nations may follow.
Furthermore, assessing legal liability is a growing area of concern;
a deployed model (e.g., self-driving cars) may introduce new areas
of liability by causing accidents unexpected from a human operator,
shown as “AI-specific error” in Figure 3. Auditing such situations
to assess liability, requires understanding the model’s decisions.
3 DEFINING INTELLIGIBILITY
So far we have treated intelligibility informally. Indeed, few com-
puting researchers have tried to formally define what makes an
AI system interpretable, transparent, or intelligible [6], but one
suggested criterion is human simulatability [25]: can a human user
easily predict the model’s output for a given input? By this defi-
nition, sparse linear models are more interpretable than dense or
non-linear ones.
Philosophers, such as Hempel and Salmon, have long debated the
nature of explanation. Lewis [23, p 217] summarizes: “To explain an
event is to provide some information about its causal history.” But
many causal explanations may exist. The fact that event C causes E
is best understood relative to an imagined counterfactual scenario,
where absent C, E would not have occurred; furthermore, C should
be minimal, an intuition known to early scientists, such as William
of Occam, and formalized by Halpern and Pearl [11].
Following this logic, we suggest that a better criterion than
simulatability is the ability to answer counterfactuals, aka “what-if”
questions. Specifically, we say that a model is intelligible to the
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AI
Errors
AI Specific
Errors
Figure 3: The dashed blue shape indicates the space of possi-
ble mistakes humans can make. The red shape denotes the
AI’s mistakes; its smaller size indicates a net reduction in
the number of errors. The gray region denotes AI-specific
mistakes a human would never make. Despite reducing the
total number of errors, a deployed model may create new
areas of liability (gray), necessitating explanations.
degree that a human user can predict how a change to a feature,
e.g., a small increase to its value, will change the model’s output
and if they can reliably modify that response curve. Note that if one
can simulate the model, predicting its output, then one can predict
the effect of a change, but not vice versa.
Linear models are especially interpretable under this definition
because they allow the answering of counterfactuals. For exam-
ple, consider a naive Bayes unigram model for sentiment analysis,
whose objective is to predict the emotional polarity (positive or neg-
ative) of a textual passage. Even if the model were large, combining
evidence from the presence of thousands of words, one could see
the effect of a given word by looking at the sign and magnitude of
the corresponding weight. This answers the question, “What if the
word had been omitted?” Similarly, by comparing the weights asso-
ciated with two words, one could predict the effect on the model of
substituting one for the other.
Ranking Intelligible Models: Since one may have a choice of
intelligible models, it is useful to consider what makes one prefer-
able to another. Social science research suggests that an explanation
is best considered a social process, a conversation between explainer
and explainee [15, 30]. As a result, Grice’s rules for cooperative
communication [10] may hold for intelligible explanations. Grice’s
maxim of quality says be truthful, only relating things that are
supported by evidence. The maxim of quantity says to give as much
information as is needed, and no more. The maxim of relation: only
say things that are relevant to the discussion. The maxim ofmanner
says to avoid ambiguity, being as clear as possible.
Miller summarizes decades of work by psychological research,
noting that explanations are contrastive, i.e., of the form “Why P
rather than Q?” The event in question, P, is termed the fact and Q is
called the foil [30]. Often the foil is not explicitly stated even though
it is crucially important to the explanation process. For example,
consider the question, “Why did you predict that the image depicts
an indigo bunting?” An explanation that points to the color blue
implicitly assumes that the foil is another bird, such as a chickadee.
But perhaps the questioner wonders why the recognizer did not
predict a pair of denim pants; in this case a more precise explana-
tion might highlight the presence of wings and a beak. Clearly, an
explanation targeted to the wrong foil will be unsatisfying, but the
nature and sophistication of a foil can depend on the end user’s
expertise; hence, the ideal explanation will differ for different peo-
ple [6]. For example, to verify that an ML system is fair, an ethicist
might generate more complex foils than a data scientist. Most ML
explanation systems have restricted their attention to elucidating
the behavior of a binary classifier, i.e., where there is only one possi-
ble foil choice. However, as we seek to explain multi-class systems,
addressing this issue becomes essential.
Many systems are simply too complex to understand without
approximation. Here, the key challenge is deciding which details
to omit. After long study psychologists determined that several
criteria can be prioritized for inclusion in an explanation: necessary
causes (vs. sufficient ones); intentional actions (vs. those taken
without deliberation); proximal causes (vs. distant ones); details
that distinguish between fact and foil; and abnormal features [30].
According to Lombrozo, humans prefer explanations that are
simpler (i.e., contain fewer clauses), more general, and coherent (i.e.,
consistent with what the human’s prior beliefs) [26]. In particular,
she observed the surprising result that humans preferred simple
(one clause) explanations to conjunctive ones, even when the prob-
ability of the latter was higher than the former [26]. These results
raise interesting questions about the purpose of explanations in
an AI system. Is an explanation’s primary purpose to convince a
human to accept the computer’s conclusions (perhaps by presenting
a simple, plausible, but unlikely explanation) or is it to educate the
human about the most likely true situation? Tversky, Kahneman,
and other psychologists have documented many cognitive biases
that lead humans to incorrect conclusions; for example, people
reason incorrectly about the probability of conjunctions, with a
concrete and vivid scenario deemed more likely than an abstract
one that strictly subsumes it [16]. Should an explanation system
exploit human limitations or seek to protect us from them?
Other studies raise an additional complication about how to
communicate a system’s uncertain predictions to human users.
Koehler found that simply presenting an explanation for a propo-
sition makes people think that it is more likely to be true [18].
Furthermore, explaining a fact in the same way as previous facts
have been explained amplifies this effect [36].
4 INHERENTLY INTELLIGIBLE MODELS
Several AI systems are inherently intelligible, and we previously
observed that linear models support counterfactual reasoning. Un-
fortunately, linear models have limited utility because they often
result in poor accuracy. More expressive choices may include simple
decision trees and compact decision lists. To concretely illustrate
the benefits of intelligibility, we focus on Generalized additive mod-
els (GAMs), which are a powerful class of ML models that relate a
set of features to the target using a linear combination of (poten-
tially nonlinear) single-feature models called shape functions [27].
For example, if y represents the target and {x1, . . . .xn } represents
the features, then a GAM model takes the form y = β0 +
∑
j fj (x j ),
where the fi s denote shape functions and the target y is computed
by summing single-feature terms. Popular shape functions include
non-linear functions such as splines and decision trees. With linear
shape functions GAMs reduce to a linear models. GA2M models
extend GAM models by including terms for pairwise interactions
between features:
y = β0 +
∑
j
fj (x j ) +
∑
i,j
fi j (xi ,x j )︸          ︷︷          ︸
pairwise terms
(1)
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Figure 4: A part of Figure 1 from [4] showing 3 (of 56 total) components for a GA2M model, which was trained to predict a
patient’s risk of dying from pneumonia. The two line graphs depict the contribution of individual features to risk: a) patient’s
age, and b) boolean variable asthma. The y-axis denotes its contribution (log odds) to predicted risk. The heatmap, c, visualizes
the contribution due to pairwise interactions between age and cancer rate.
Caruana et al. observed that for domains containing a moderate
number of semantic features, GA2M models achieve performance
that is competitive with inscrutable models, such as random forests
and neural networks, while remaining intelligible [4]. Lou et al.
observed that among methods available for learning GA2Mmodels,
the version with bagged shallow regression tree shape functions
learned via gradient boosting achieves the highest accuracy [27].
Both GAM and GA2M are considered interpretable because the
model’s learned behavior can be easily understood by examining
or visualizing the contribution of terms (individual or pairs of fea-
tures) to the final prediction. For example, Figure 4 depicts a GA2M
model trained to predict a patient’s risk of dying due to pneumonia,
showing the contribution (log odds) to total risk for a subset of
terms. A positive contribution increases risk, whereas a negative
contribution decreases risk. For example, Figure 4(a) shows how
the patient’s age affects predicted risk. While the risk is low and
steady for young patients (e.g., age < 20), it increases rapidly for
older patients (age > 67). Interestingly, the model shows a sudden
increase at age 86; perhaps a result of less aggressive care by doctors
for patients “whose time has come.” Even more surprising is the
sudden drop for patients over 100. This might be another social
effect; once a patient reaches the magic “100”, he or she gets more
aggressive care. One benefit of an interpretable model is its ability
to highlight these issues, spurring deeper analysis.
Figure 4(b) illustrates another surprising aspect of the learned
model; apparently, a history of asthma, a respiratory disease, de-
creases the patients risk of dying from pneumonia! This finding is
counter-intuitive to any physician, who recognizes that asthma,
in fact, should in theory increase such risk. When Caruana et al.
checked the data, they concluded that the lower risk was likely due
to correlated variables — asthma patients typically receive timely
and aggressive therapy for lung issues. Therefore, although the
model was highly accurate on the test set, it would likely fail, dra-
matically underestimating the risk to a patient with asthma who
had not been previously treated for the disease.
Facilitating Human Control of GA2M Models: A domain
expert can fix such erroneous patterns learned by the model by set-
ting the weight of the asthma term to zero. In fact, GA2Ms let users
provide much more comprehensive feedback to the model by using
a GUI to redraw a line graph for model terms [4]. An alternative
remedy might be to introduce a new feature to the model, represent-
ing whether the patient had been recently seen by a pulmonologist.
After adding this feature, which is highly correlated with asthma,
and retraining, the newly-learned model would likely reflect that
asthma (by itself) increases the risk of dying from pneumonia.
There are two more takeaways from this anecdote. First, the
absence of an important feature in the data representation can cause
any AI system to learn unintuitive behavior for another, correlated
feature. Second, if the learner is intelligible, then this unintuitive
behavior is immediately apparent, allowing appropriate skepticism
(despite high test accuracy) and easier debugging.
Recall that GA2Ms are more expressive than simple GAMs be-
cause they include pairwise terms. Figure 4(c) depicts such a term for
the features age and cancer. This explanation indicates that among
the patients who have cancer, the younger ones are at higher risk.
This may be because the younger patients who develop cancer are
probably critically ill. Again, since doctors can readily inspect these
terms, they know if the learner develops unexpected conclusions.
Limitations: As described, GA2M models are restricted to bi-
nary classification, and so explanations are clearly contrastive —
there is only one choice of foil. One could extend GA2M to handle
multiple classes by training n one-vs-rest classifiers or building a hi-
erarchy of classifiers. However, while these approaches would yield
a working multi-class classifier, we don’t know if they preserve
model intelligibility, nor whether a user could effectively adjust
such a model by editing the shape functions.
Furthermore, recall that GA2Ms decompose their prediction into
effects of individual termswhich can be visualized. However, if users
are confused about what terms mean, they will not understand the
model or be able to ask meaningful “what-if” questions. Moreover,
if there are too many features, the model’s complexity may be over-
whelming. Lipton notes that the effort required to simulate some
models (such as decision trees) may grow logarithmically with the
number of parameters [25], but for GA2M the number of visualiza-
tions to inspect could increase quadratically. Several methods might
help users manage this complexity; for example, the terms could
be ordered by importance; however, it’s not clear how to estimate
importance. Possible methods include using an ablation analysis to
compute influence of terms on model performance or computing
the maximum contribution of terms as seen in the training samples.
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Alternatively, a domain expert could group terms semantically to
facilitate perusal.
However, when the number of features grows into the millions —
which occurs when dealing with classifiers over text, audio, image
and video data — existing intelligible models do not perform nearly
as well as inscrutable methods, like deep neural networks. Since
these models combine millions of features in complex, nonlinear
ways, they are beyond human capacity to simulate.
5 UNDERSTANDING INSCRUTABLE MODELS
There are two ways that an AI model may be inscrutable. It may
be provided as a blackbox API, such as Microsoft Cognitive Ser-
vices, which uses machine learning to provide image-recognition
capabilities but does not allow inspection of the underlying model.
Alternatively, the model may be under the user’s control yet ex-
tremely complex, such as a deep, neural network, where a user
has access to myriad learned parameters but can not reasonably
interpret them. How can one best explain such models to the user?
The Comprehensibility / Fidelity Trade-Off: A good expla-
nation of an event is both easy to understand and faithful, conveying
the true cause of the event. Unfortunately, these two criteria almost
always conflict. Consider the predictions of a deep neural network
with millions of nodes: a complete and accurate trace of the net-
work’s prediction would be far too complex to understand, but any
simplification sacrifices faithfulness.
Finding a satisfying explanation, therefore, requires balancing
the competing goals of comprehensibility and fidelity. Lakkaraju
et al. [22] suggest formulating an explicit optimization of this form
and propose an approximation algorithm for generating global ex-
planations in the form of compact sets of if-then rules. Ribeiro et al.
describe a similar optimization algorithm that balances faithfulness
and coverage in its search for summary rules [34].
Indeed, all methods for rendering an inscrutable model intelli-
gible require mapping the complex model to a simpler one [28].
Several high-level approaches to mapping have been proposed.
Local Explanations: One way to simplify the explanation of a
learned model is to make it relative to a single input query. Such
explanations, which are termed local [33] or instance-based [20], are
akin to a doctor explaining specific reasons for a patient’s diagnosis
rather than communicating all of her medical knowledge. Contrast
this approach with the global understanding of the model that
one gets with a GA2M model. Mathematically, one can see a local
explanation as currying — several variables in the model are fixed
to specific values, allowing simplification.
Generating a local explanations is a common practice in AI
systems. For example, early rule-based expert systems included
explanation systems that augmented a trace of the system’s rea-
soning — for a particular case — with background knowledge [38].
Recommender systems, one of the first deployed uses of machine
learning, also induced demand for explanations of their specific
recommendations; the most satisfying answers combined justifica-
tions based on the user’s previous choices, ratings of similar users,
and features of the items being recommended [32].
Locally-Approximate Explanations: In many cases, however,
even a local explanation can be too complex to understand without
approximation. Here, the key challenge is deciding which details
Figure 5: The intuition guiding LIME’smethod for construct-
ing an approximate local explanation (taken from [33]):
“The black-box model’s complex decision function, f , (un-
known to LIME) is represented by the blue/pink background,
which cannot be approximated well by a linear model. The
bold red cross is the instance being explained. LIME samples
instances, gets predictions using f , and weighs them by the
proximity to the instance being explained (represented here
by size). The dashed line is the learned explanation that is
locally (but not globally) faithful.”
to omit when creating the simpler explanatory model. Human pref-
erences, discovered by psychologists and summarized in Section 3,
should guide algorithms that construct these simplifications.
Ribeiro et al.’s LIME system [33] is a good example of a system
for generating a locally-approximate explanatory model of an arbi-
trary learned model, but it sidesteps part of the question of which
details to omit. Instead, LIME requires the developer to provide two
additional inputs: 1) a set of semantically meaningful features X ′
that can be computed from the original features, and 2) an inter-
pretable learning algorithm, such as a linear classifier (or a GA2M),
which it uses to generate an explanation in terms of the X ′.
The insight behind LIME is shown in Figure 5. Given an instance
to explain, shown as the bolded red cross, LIME randomly generates
a set of similar instances and uses the blackbox classifier, f , to
predict their values (shown as the red crosses and blue circles).
These predictions are weighted by their similarity to the input
instance (akin to locally-weighted regression) and used to train a
new, simpler intelligible classifier, shown on the figure as the linear
decision boundary, using X ′, the smaller set of semantic features.
The user receives the intelligible classifier as an explanation. While
this explanation model [28] is likely a poor global representation of
f , it is hopefully an accurate local approximation of the boundary
in the vicinity of the instance being explained.
Ribeiro et al. tested LIME on several domains. For example, they
explained the predictions of a convolutional neural network image
classifier by converting the pixel-level features into a smaller set
of “super-pixels;” to do so, they ran an off-the-shelf segmentation
algorithm that identified regions in the input image and varied
the color of some these regions when generating “similar” images.
While LIME provides no formal guarantees about its explanations,
studies showed that LIME’s explanations helped users evaluate
which of several classifiers best generalizes.
Choice of Explanatory Vocabulary: Ribeiro et al.’s use of pre-
segmented image regions to explain image classification decisions
illustrates the larger problem of determining an explanatory vo-
cabulary. Clearly, it would not make sense to try to identify the
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Fig. 1. Our proposed model generates visual explanations. Visual explanations are both
image relevant and class relevant. In contrast, image descriptions are image relevant,
but not necessarily class relevant, and class definitions are class relevant but not nec-
essarily image relevant. In the visual explanations above, class discriminative visual
features that are also present in the image are discussed.
shown in Figure 1, explanations are distinct from descriptions, which provide
a sentence based only on visual information, and definitions, which provide a
sentence based only on class information. Unlike descriptions and definitions,
visual explanations detail why a certain category is appropriate for a given image
while only mentioning image relevant features. As an example, let us consider
an image classification system that predicts a certain image belongs to the class
“western grebe” (Figure 1, top). A standard captioning system might provide a
description such as “This is a large bird with a white neck and black back in the
water.” However, as this description does not mention discriminative features, it
could also be applied to a “laysan albatross” (Figure 1, bottom). In contrast, we
propose to provide explanations, such as “This is a western grebe because this
bird has a long white neck, pointy yellow beak, and a red eye.” The explanation
includes the “red eye” property, e.g., when crucial for distinguishing between
“western grebe” and “laysan albatross”. As such, our system explains why the
predicted category is the most appropriate for the image.
We outline our approach in Figure 2. We condition language generation on
both an image and a predicted class label which allows us to generate class-
specific sentences. Unlike other caption models, which condition on visual fea-
tures from a network pre-trained on ImageNet [6], our model also includes a
fine-grained recognition pipeline to produce strong image features [3]. Like many
contemporary description models [7,8,9,10,11], our model learns to generate a
sequence of words using an LSTM [12]. However, we design a novel loss function
which encourages generated sentences to include class discriminative informa-
tion. One challenge in designing a loss to optimize for class specificity is that
class specificity is a global sentence property: e.g., whereas a sentence “This is
an all black bird with a bright red eye” is class specific to a “Bronzed Cowbird”,
words and phrases in the sentence, such as “black” or “red eye” are less class
discriminative on their own. Our proposed generation loss enforces that gener-
ated sequences fulfill a certain global property, such as category specificity. Our
final output is a sampled sentence, so we backpropagate the discriminative loss
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Laysan Albatross Description:
Class Definition:
and white belly.
Visual Explanation:
neck and black back.
Fig. 1. Our proposed model generat s visual explanations. Visual explanations are both
image relev nt nd class relevant. In contrast, image descriptions are image relevant,
but not necessarily class relevant, and class definitions are class relevant but not nec-
essarily image releva t. I the visual expla ations above, class discriminative visual
features that are also present in the image are discussed.
shown in Figure 1, explan tions a e distinct from descriptions, which provide
a sentence based only on visual informatio , and definitions, which provide a
sentence based only on class information. Unlike descriptions and definitions,
visual explanations de ail why a certai cat gory is appropriate for a given image
while only mentioning image relevant features. As an example, let us consider
an image classification system that predicts a certain image belongs to the class
“western grebe” (Figur 1, top). A standard captioning system might provide a
description such as “This is a large bird with a white neck and black back in the
water.” However, s this description oes n t mention discriminative features, it
could also be applied to a “laysan albatross” (Figure 1, bottom). In contrast, we
propose to provide explanations, such as “This is a western grebe because this
bird has a long white neck, pointy yellow beak, and a red eye.” The explanation
includes the “red eye” property, e.g., when crucial for distinguishing between
“western grebe” and “laysan albatross”. As such, our system explains why the
predicted category is the most appropriate for the image.
We outline our approach in Figure 2. We condition language generation on
both an image and a predicted class label which allows us to generate class-
specific sentences. Unlike other caption models, which condition on visual fea-
tures from a network pre-trained on ImageNet [6], our model also includes a
fine-grained recognition pipeline to produce strong image features [3]. Like many
contemporary description models [7,8,9,10,11], our model learns to generate a
sequence of words using an LSTM [12]. However, we design a novel loss function
which encourages generated sentences to include class discriminative informa-
tion. One challenge in designing a loss to optimize for class specificity is that
class specificity is a global sentence property: e.g., whereas a sentence “This is
an all black bird with a bright red eye” is class specific to a “Bronzed Cowbird”,
words and phrases in the sentence, such as “black” or “red eye” are less class
discriminative on their own. Our proposed generation loss enforces that gener-
ated sequences fulfill a certain global property, such as category specificity. Our
final output is a sampled sentence, so we backpropagate the discriminative loss
L ysan lbatross Description: This is a large bird with a white neck and a black beak in 
the water
.
Class Definition: The Laysan Albatross is a large seabird with a hooked 
yellow beak, black back and white belly.
Visual Explanation: This is a Laysan Albatross because this bird has a
hooked yellow beak white neck and black back.
Description: This is a large bird with a white neck and a black 
beak in the water.
Class Definition: The Laysan Albatross is a large seabird with     
a hooked yellow beak, a black back, and a white belly.
Visual Explanation: This is a Laysan Albatross because this
bird has a hooked yellow beak white neck and black back.
Figure 6: A visual explanation taken from [13]: “Visual ex-
planations are both image relevant and class relevant. In
contrast, image descriptions are image relevant, but not nec-
essarily class relevant, and class definitions are class rele-
vant but not necessarily image relevant.”
exact pixel that led to the decisi : pixel are to low level a rep-
resentation and are not semantically meaningful to users. In fact,
deep neural network’s power comes from the very fact that their
hidden layers are trained to recognize latent features in a manner
that seems to perform much better than previous efforts to define
such features independently. Deep networks are inscrutable exactly
because we do not know what those hidden features denote.
To explain the behavior of such models, however, we must find
some high-level abstraction over the input pixels hat communicates
the model’s essence. Ribeiro et al.’s decision to use an off-the-shelf
image-segmentation system was pragmatic. The regions it selected
are easily visualized and carry some semantic value. However, re-
gions are chosen without any regard to how the classifier makes
decision. To explain a blackbox model, where there is no possible
access to the classifier’s internal representation, there is likely no
better option; any explanation will lack faithfulness.
However, if a user can access the classifier and tailor the expla-
nation system to it, there are ways to choose a more meaningful
vocabulary. One interesting method jointly trains a classifier with a
natural language, image captioning system [13]. The classifier uses
training dat that is labeled with the objec s appearing in the i age;
the captioning system is labeled with English sentences describ-
ing the appearance of the image. By training these systems jointly,
the variables in the hidden layers may get aligned to semantically
mea ingful c ncepts, even as they are being trained to provide
discriminative power. This results in English language descriptions
of images that have both high image relevance (from the captioning
training data) and high class relevance (from the object recognition
training data), as shown in Figure 6.
While this method works well for many examples, some expla-
nations include details that are not actually present in the image;
newer approaches, such as phrase-critic methods, may create even
better descriptions [14]. Another approach might determine if there
are hidden layers in the learned classifier that learn concept corre-
sponding to something meaningful. For example, Zeiler and Fergus
observed that certain layers may function as edge or pattern de-
tectors [40]. Whenever a user can identify the presence of such
layers, then it may be preferable to use them in the explanation.
Bau et al. describe n utom tic mechanism for matching CNN rep-
resent tions with semantically meaningful concepts using a large,
labeled corpus of objects, parts, and texture; furthermore, using this
alignment, their method quantitatively cores CNN inte pretability,
potentially suggesting a way to optimize for intelligible models.
However, many obstacles remain. As one example, it is not clear
that there are satisfying ways to describe important, discriminative
features, which are often intangible, e.g., textures. An intelligible
explanation may need to define new terms or combine language
with other modalities, like patches of an image. Another challenge
is inducing first-order, relational descriptions, which would enable
desc iptions uch as “a spider because it has eight legs” and “full
because all seats are occupied.” While quantified and relational
abstractions are very natural for people, progress in statistical-
relational learning has been slow and there aremany open questions
for neuro-symbolic learning [3].
Facilitating User Control with Explanatory Models: Gen-
erating an explanation by mapping an inscrutable model into a
simpler, explanatory model is only half of the battle. In addition
to answer ng c unterfactuals about the original model, we would
ideally be able to map any control actions the user takes in the
explanatory model back as adjustments to the original, inscrutable
model. For example, Section 4 illustrated how a user could directly
edit a GA2M’s shape curve (Figure 4(b)) to change the model’s
response to asthma. Is there a way to interpret such an action,
made to an intelligible explanatory model, as a modification to the
original, inscrutable model? It seems unlikely that we’ll discover
a general method to do this for arbitrary source models, since the
abstraction mapping is not invertible in general. However, there
are likely methods for mapping backwards to specific classes of
source models or for specific types of feature-transform mappings.
This is an important area for future study.
6 TOWARDS INTERACTIVE EXPLANATION
The optimal choice of explanation depends on the audience. Just as
a human teacher would explain physics differently to students who
know or do not yet know calculus, the technical sophistication and
background knowledge of the recipient affects the suitability of a
machine-generated explanation. Furthermore, the concerns of a
house seeker whose mortgage application was denied due to a FICO
score differ from those of a developer or data scientist debugging
the system. Therefore, an ideal explainer should model the user’s
backgr und over the course of many inter ctions.
The HCI community has long studied mental models [31], and
many intelligent tutoring systems (ITSs) build explicit models of stu-
dents’ knowledge and misconceptions [2]. However, the framework
for these models are typically hand-engineered for each subject
domain, so it may be difficult to adapt ITS approaches to a system
that aims to explain an arbitrary black-box learner.
Even with an accurate user model, it is likely that an explana-
tion will not answer all of a us r’ concerns, because the human
may have follow-up questions. We conclude that an explanation
system should be interactive, supporting such questions from and
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Figure 7: An example of an interactive explanatory dialog for gaining insight into aDOG/FISH image classifier. (For illustration,
the questions and answers are shown in English language text, but our use of a ‘dialog’ is for illustration only. An interactive
GUI, e.g., building on the ideas of Krause et al. [20], would likely be a better realization.)
actions by the user. This matches results from psychology literature,
summarized in Section 2, and highlights Grice’s maxims, especially
those pertaining to quantity and relation. It also builds on Lim and
Dey’s work in ubiquitous computing, which investigated the kinds
of questions users wished to ask about complex, context-aware
applications [24]. We envision an interactive explanation system
that supports many different follow-up and drill-down action after
presenting a user with an initial explanation:
• Redirecting the answer by changing the foil: “Sure, but why didn’t
you predict class C?”
• Asking for more detail (i.e., a more complex explanatory model),
perhaps while restricting the explanation to a subregion of
feature space: “I’m only concerned about women over age 50...”
• Asking for a decision’s rationale: “What made you believe this?”
To which the system might respond by displaying the labeled
training examples that were most influential in reaching that
decision, e.g., ones identified by influence functions [19] or
nearest neighbor methods.
• Query the model’s sensitivity by asking what minimal perturba-
tions to certain features would lead to a different output.
• Changing the vocabulary by adding (or removing) a feature in
the explanatory model, either from a predefined set, by using
methods from machine teaching, or with concept activation
vectors [17].
• Perturbing the input example to see the effect on both prediction
and explanation. In addition to aiding understanding of the
model (directly testing a counterfactual), this action enables an
affected user who wants to contest the initial prediction: “But
officer, one of those prior DUIs was overturned...?”
• Adjusting the model: Based on new understanding, the user may
wish to correct the model. Here, we expect to build on tools
for interactive machine learning [1] and explanatory debug-
ging [20, 21], which have explored interactions for adding new
training examples, correcting erroneous labels in existing data,
specifying new features, and modifying shape functions. As
mentioned in the previous section, it may be challenging to
map user adjustments, that are made in reference to an explana-
tory model, back into the original, inscrutable model.
To make these ideas concrete, Figure 7 presents a possible dialog
as a user tries to understand the robustness of a deep neural dog/fish
classifier built atop Inception v3 [39]. As the figure shows: 1) The
computer correctly predicts that the image depicts a fish. 2) The user
requests an explanation, which is provided using LIME [33]. 3) The
user, concerned that the classifier is paying more attention to the
background than to the fish itself, asks to see the training data that
influenced the classifier; the nearest neighbors are computed using
influence functions [19]. While there are anemones in those images,
it also seems that the system is recognizing a clownfish. 4) To gain
confidence, the user edits the input image to remove the background,
resubmits it to the classifier and checks the explanation.
7 EXPLAINING COMBINATORIAL SEARCH
Most of the preceding discussion has focused on intelligiblemachine
learning, which is just one type of artificial intelligence. However,
the same issues also confront systems based on deep-lookahead
search. While many planning algorithms have strong theoretical
properties, such as soundness, they search over action models that
include their own assumptions. Furthermore, goal specifications
are likewise incomplete [29]. If these unspoken assumptions are
incorrect, then a formally correct plan may still be disastrous.
Consider a planning algorithm that has generated a sequence
of actions for a remote, mobile robot. If the plan is short with a
moderate number of actions, then the problemmay be inherently in-
telligible, and a human could easily spot a problem. However, larger
search spaces could be cognitively overwhelming. In these cases,
local explanations offer a simplification technique that is helpful,
just as it was when explaining machine learning. The vocabulary
issue is likewise crucial: how does one succinctly and abstractly
summarize a complete search subtree? Depending on the choice of
explanatory foil, different answers are appropriate [8]. Sreedharan
et al. describe an algorithm for generating the minimal explanation
that patches a user’s partial understanding of a domain [37]. Work
on mixed-initiative planning [7] has demonstrated the importance
of supporting interactive dialog with a planning system. Since many
AI systems, e.g., AlphaGo [35], combine deep search and machine
learning, additional challenges will result from the need to explain
interactions between combinatorics and learned models.
8 FINAL THOUGHTS
In order to trust deployed AI systems, we must not only improve
their robustness [5], but also develop ways to make their reasoning
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intelligible. Intelligibility will help us spot AI that makes mistakes
due to distributional drift or incomplete representations of goals
and features. Intelligibility will also facilitate control by humans in
increasingly common collaborative human/AI teams. Furthermore,
intelligibility will help humans learn from AI. Finally, there are
legal reasons to want intelligible AI, including the European GDPR
and a growing need to assign liability when AI errs.
Depending on the complexity of the models involved, two ap-
proaches to enhancing understanding may be appropriate: 1) using
an inherently interpretable model, or 2) adopting an inscrutably
complex model and generating post hoc explanations by mapping it
to a simpler, explanatory model through a combination of currying
and local approximation. When learning a model over a medium
number of human-interpretable features, one may confidently bal-
ance performance and intelligibility with approaches like GA2Ms.
However, for problems with thousands or millions of features, per-
formance requirements likely force the adoption of inscrutable
methods, such as deep neural networks or boosted decision trees.
In these situations, post-hoc explanations may be the only way to
facilitate human understanding.
Research on explanation algorithms is developing rapidly, with
work on both local (instance-specific) explanations and global ap-
proximations to the learned model. A key challenge for all these
approaches is the construction of an explanation vocabulary, es-
sentially a set of features used in the approximate explanation
model. Different explanatory models may be appropriate for differ-
ent choices of explanatory foil, an aspect deserving more attention
from systems builders. While many intelligible models can be di-
rectly edited by a user, more research is needed to determine how
best to map such actions back to modify an underlying inscrutable
model. Results from psychology show that explanation is a social
process, best thought of as a conversation. As a result, we advocate
increased work on interactive explanation systems that support
a wide range of follow-up actions. To spur rapid progress in this
important field, we hope to see collaboration between researchers
in multiple disciplines.
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